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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRENT V. LOVELESS
Plaintiff and
Appellee,
vs.
JEANNE MCNEIL LOVELESS
Defendant and
Apellant.

Appellate No. 970184-CA
Priority No. 16

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
JEANNE MCNIEL LOVELESS
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to award

Defendant/Appellant an interest in the marital home?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing

to award Defendant/Appellant a reasonable portion of the
value increase of the marital home during the marriage?
3.

Did the trial court err in finding that the marital

home was Plaintiff/Appellee1s separate property?
4.

Did the trial court err in allowing the testimony

of an expert setting the value of the property at the time of
separation instead of the time of divorce?
5.

Did the trial court err in fixing the value of the

marital property as of the time of separation rather than the
time of divorce?
6.

Did

the

Plaintiff/Appellee

trial
a

court

judgment

for

err
debts

in

awarding

incurred

after

separation for Christmas gifts for his family and children?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a final Order of Judgment of the
Fourth District Court in the above-entitled domestic matter
distributing the assets and debts of the parties herein.
B.

Disposition of the Case Below.

On September 3, and 18, 1996, the above-entitled matter
came before the trial court for trial on the issues of the
distribution of assets and debts of the parties.
was presented at trial by way of testimony.

Evidence

Counsel for

Defendant objected at trial and by way of a Motion in Limine
(R. at 227) to the use of the separation date to determine
the value of the marital real property and to the use of a
cost analysis to determine the value of the marital real
property, which objections were overruled by the trial court.
Final arguments were submitted to the trial court in writing
(R. at 285) and the trial court entered its Findings of Fact
2

and Conclusions of Law and Final Order of Judgment (R. at
350) awarding Plaintiff the marital real property free of any
interest of Defendant yet requiring Defendant to pay marital
debt.

Defendant has appealed said Final Order of Judgment.

C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

The parties were married on March 11, 1994. At the

time of marriage Plaintiff (hereinafter Brent Loveless) owned
a home and real property in Payson City, Utah, owned a
retirement program through his employment, and owned an
insurance annuity.
2.

After the marriage Defendant (hereinafter Jeanne)

contributed furniture and other items to a garage sale for
the purpose of obtaining funds to improve the basement in the
home. (R. at 417-451)
3.

Jeanne further contributed to the improvement of

the home by paying her son to install plumbing in said
basement. (R. at 440) .
4.

Jeanne further contributed by painting and helping

with other work in improving said basement, as well as doing
a large portion of the domestic chores for Brent Loveless and
his children. (R. at 417-451).
5.

Jeanne used her wages to purchase food, pay the
3

children allowances, gifts, entertainment, and to purchase
items for the home such as blinds and decorations. (R. at
417-451)
6.

Brent Loveless used his wages to pay the Mortgage

on the home in the amount of $21,382.00, contribute to his
retirement in the amount of $1,460.00, and contribute to his
insurance annuity in the amount of $1,600.00. (R. at 340)
7.
returns

During the marriage the parties filed joint tax
wherein

Brent

Loveless

claimed

Jeanne

and her

daughter as dependants. (Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 1 & 2) .
8.

A large portion of the credit card debt incurred by

Brent Loveless prior to the Divorce and after separation was
to purchase Christmas gifts for his children and family. (R.
at 322) .
9.

Brent Loveless entered the marriage with credit

card debt of approximately $1,300.00. (R. at 384).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in failing to find that the real
property owned by Brent Loveless prior to the marriage
changed character to marital property based upon the payment
of over $21,000.00 of the mortgage with marital funds, as
well as Jeanne's other contributions to maintain and enhance
4

the property.
The trial court further erred in fixing the value of
said property as of the date of separation rather than the
date of divorce, and for accepting expert testimony valuing
the property at the time of separation.
The trial court further erred by ordering Jeanne to pay
one-half

(1/2) of the debt incurred by Brent Loveless,

including a $1,300.00 debt he brought into the marriage and
$2,400.00

incurred

after

separation

for

groceries

and

Christmas gifts for his children.
The serious inconsistencies of trial court indicate a
prejudice

and

abuse

of

discretion

which

requires

the

Appellate Court to substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court on all issues of fact and law.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO AWARD
JEANNE ONE-HALF OF THE VALUE THAT THE
MARITAL HOME INCREASED DURING THE MARRIAGE.
During the course of the marriage, Brent Loveless used
marital

funds

(his wages) to pay $21,382.00 toward the

mortgage on the marital residence.

During the course of the

marriage the value of the home increase from $98,000.00
5

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 17) to $143,000.00. (Defendant's
Exhibit No. 32). Said increase was due to an increase in the
market as well as the finishing of living space in the
basement.
Although the trial court has discretion in awarding
property which is marital, separate or even inherited in
divorce proceedings,
1169(Ut.

App.

(see e.g. Burt

1990))

the

Utah

v. Burt, 799

courts

have

P.2d

generally

recognized that even separate property can lose its "separate
character"

and

become

marital

property.

Schaumbera, 875 P.2d 598 (Ut. App. 1994).

Schaumberg

v.

In Schaumberg,

Husband had purchased real property with inherited funds.
Husband then used marital funds to make the payments on said
property as well as make some improvements.

Wife did not

work and contributed no monies directly to the property.

The

Utah Court of Appeals found that the property had changed its
character from a separate asset to a marital asset and ruled
that Wife was entitled to one-half of the appreciation of the
property after its purchase and not including the inherited
funds used for said purchase. Id. at 603.
In the case before the Court, there is no dispute that
the real property was separate prior to the marriage. As in
6

Schaumberg, thereafter Brent Loveless used marital funds to
both maintain and improve said property.

Moreover, Jeanne

made contributions toward said property not made by the
"Wife" in Schaumberg, including but not limited to money,
furniture, decorations, and personal work.

Further, as in

Schaumberg, Brent Loveless asserted that all loans and debts,
even those incurred in improving the house, were marital and
requested that Jeanne pay one-half of said debts. (See e.g.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 24) (R. at 214) (R. at 383).

It seems

clear that under the Court's analysis in Schaumberg, Jeanne
would be entitled to one-half (1/2) of the appreciation of
the marital real property during the marriage.
While this Court in Schaumberg awarded Wife a one-half
(1/2) interest with no monetary contribution to the property
on her part, the Utah Supreme Court has also made it clear
that a sizable contribution is unnecessary to entitle a
spouse to a full share of a property's value.

In the case of

Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982) Wife contributed
only a small portion towards the purchase and maintenance of
property more or less inherited by Husband, yet she received
a full share of its value upon divorce.
It should be pointed out that there are cases which
7

Brent Loveless claims appear to be in conflict with those
cited above.

In the case of Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133

(Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme Court named several factors to
be considered in determining whether premarital property,
gifts

and

inheritances

marital property.

should

be

viewed

as

separate

or

Among them are the amount and kind of

property to be divided; whether the property was acquired
before or during the marriage; the source of the property;
the health of the parties; the parties' standard of living,
respective financial conditions, needs and earning capacity;
the duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage;
the parties' ages at the time of marriage and of divorce;
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary
relationship the property division has with the amount of
alimony and child support to be awarded.
The Court in Burke stated that

ff

[o]f particular concern

. . . is whether one spouse has made any contribution toward
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse (citing
Dubois v. Dubois, 504 P.2d

1380, 1381

(Utah 1987)),

and

whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint
efforts of the parties, (citing Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d
705,

706

(Utah 1982)).

The Court went on to find that
8

Husband had done nothing to contribute to or enhance the
value of the property inherited by Wife and was, therefore,
not entitled to share in its value.
Closer

examination

shows

that

Burke

consistent with both Schaumberg and Workman.

is

actually

In Burke, Wife

inherited the subject property without any debt or liens
thereon.

No payments were made with marital property to

either maintain or enhance the property and, therefore, the
property failed to change character from separate to marital
property.
In the case before the Court, Jeanne made numerous
contributions to the maintenance and enhancement of the
property, not to mention the payment of over $21,000.00
toward the debt on said property. As in Schaumberg, the fact
that said payments were made with Brent Loveless' wages is
irrelevant.

Said monies were a marital asset when used to

make the house payment just as they were a marital asset when
used

to

contribute

to

Brent

Loveless'

retirement

and

insurance annuity, both of which, Brent Loveless agreed and
the trial court ordered, Jeanne was entitled to a one-half
(1/2) interest.

9

It should also be pointed out that the trial court
failed to follow the analysis set forth in Burke in depriving
Jeanne of an interest in the marital home.

The trial court

did find that Jeanne did make contributions to both the
marriage

and the property

including

marital income. (R. at 328) .

over

$21,000.00 in

The trial court, however,

claimed this was not significant because a large portion of
the house payment went toward interest.

The fact that a

portion of mortgage payments goes to interest as well as
principal is irrelevant.

The payment of over $21,000.00 was

required to "maintain and enhance" the value of the property
or it would have been lost.

Moreover, such an amount can

hardly be considered insignificant.
The trial court further attached significance to the
fact that a good deal of the property's increased value was
due to appreciation rather than the improvement thereto.

The

case law is clear, however, that when the property changes
character it becomes marital property and the parties must
divide all of the increased value including appreciation.
The method of division used by the trial court herein is
without precedent and unsupported in fact or law.

10

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING THE VALUE
OF THE MARITAL, REAL PROPERTY AT THE TIME
OF SEPARATION AND THE VALUE THEREOF SHOULD
BE FIXED AS OF THE DATE OF DIVORCE.
The trial court found that because the marriage had
deteriorated to the point that Jeanne was looking for an
apartment to live in back in June of 1995, but could not find
one,

the marriage was essentially over at the time of

separation, in December of 1995, and the value of the real
property should be set as of that date. (R. at 328). Such a
holding is completely contrary to current Utah statute and to
current case law.
In the matter of Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218
(Utah 1980) , one of the parties purchased a home not only
subsequent to separation but subsequent to the filing of the
divorce action.

In rejecting said party's attempt to protect

the equity accumulated prior to the time of divorce the Utah
Supreme Court held unequivocally that "[t]he marital estate
is evaluated according to the existing property interests at
the

time

the marriage

divorce". Id. at 1222.

is terminated

by

the

decree of

The Court further stated that "such

an argument is contrary to the specific provisions of Section
11

30-3-5, U.C.A.,

1953, and the rulings of this court in

accordance therewith". Id.
After citing to Fletcher, above, the Utah Supreme Court
reiterated said rule of law in the case of Beraer v. Beraer,
713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985), wherein the Court ruled that an
expert's opinion was inconclusive as to the valuation of
marital property because it was not valued at the time of
divorce.

The only exception to the above rules is in a case

where "one party has dissipated and asset, hidden its value,
or otherwise acted obstructively".
1050,

1052

(Ut. App. 1987).

Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d

There have never been any

allegations in the case presently before the Court that any
of the above exceptions are applicable, nor were there any
findings of such.
The trial court in the present case has clearly erred
first, by affixing the value of the marital real property as
of the date of separation, rather than the date of divorce as
required by law, and second, by accepting the evidence of
Brent Loveless' expert regarding the value of the marital
property at $137,000.00 as of the date of separation rather
than the evidence of Jeanne's expert which fixed the value of
the property at $143,000.00 at the time of divorce.
12

Based

upon the value of the property at the time of marriage of
$98,000.00, Jeanne is entitled to an equitable distribution
of one-half (1/2) of the $45,000.00 increase therein.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING JEANNE
TO PAY ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE DEBT BRENT
LOVELESS INCURRED AFTER SEPARATION TO
PURCHASE CHRISTMAS GIFTS FOR HIS FAMILY.
After

separation,

Brent

Loveless

ran

his

personal

Mastercard bill up from $1,334.00 to $3,716.00 for what he
admitted to be groceries and Christmas gifts. (R. at 322).
Moreover, Brent Loveless entered the marriage with a debt on
his Mastercard of approximately $1,300.00.(R. at 384). Brent
Loveless

continued

to

maintain

a high

balance

on

his

Mastercard until the time of divorce, and the trial court
somehow found that Jeanne was responsible for one-half of
said amount. The trial court did not, however, suggest that
Brent Loveless be responsible for paying any of Jeanne's post
separation debt.

Although the original debt had long been

paid off by the time of divorce herein, any amount awarded to
Brent

Loveless

should

be

reduced

by

the

approximately

$2,400.00 that is obviously his personal debt and has nothing
to do with the parties' marriage as well as the $1300.00

13

originally on said card.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT
IN ITS RULINGS TO THE POINT OF PREJUDICING
JEANNE AND WRONGFULLY FAVORING PLAINTIFF.
When looking at the trial court's rulings as a whole, it
is hard to miss the inconsistencies that abound and have no
explanation. How can the trial court find that the home was
paid for with marital funds, as were the contributions to
Brent Loveless1 retirement and insurance annuity, and yet the
home is separate property while the retirement and insurance
annuity are marital property which must be split?

How can

the trial court find that the parties never commingled their
monies and yet Jeanne, who made a fraction of the money that
Brent Loveless did, is still responsible for one-half of all
the debt he incurred, over and above what she has already
paid herself without his help, and including post-separation
groceries and Christmas gifts he gave to his family and
children?
How can the trial court find that the property values
should be set as of the time of separation, when the case law
provided to the court during the Motion in Limine, during the
trial and in closing argument clearly provides that values be
14

set as of the time of divorce and that opinion as to value at
any other time not be accepted?

How can the trial court

refuse to grant Jeanne an equitable interest in the marital
real property when the clear case law provided to the trial
court at the Motion in Limine, during the trial, during
closing argument and in the final trial brief provides for
such a grant?
Such inconsistencies point to a prejudice of Jeanne in
this matter or of a wrongful favoring of the Plaintiff to the
point that the trial court has abused its discretion and its
judgment of both the facts and law in this matter should be
substituted by that of the Utah Court of Appeals.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in failing to find that the real
property owned by Brent Loveless prior to the marriage
changed character to marital property based upon the payment
of over $21,000.00 of the mortgage with marital funds, as
well as Jeanne's other contributions to maintain and enhance
the property.
The trial court further erred in fixing the value of
said property as of the date of separation rather than the
date of divorce, and for accepting expert testimony valuing
15

the property at the time of separation.
The trial court further erred by ordering Jeanne to pay
one-half

(1/2) of the debt incurred by Brent Loveless,

including a $1,300.00 debt he brought into the marriage and
$2,400.00

incurred

after

separation

for

groceries

and

Christmas gifts for his children.
The serious inconsistencies of trial court indicate a
prejudice

and

abuse

of

discretion

which

requires

the

Appellate Court to substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court on all issues of fact and law.
ADDENDUM
Defendant/Appellant Jeanne Loveless has appended hereto
copies of the following documents:
1.
2.

Ruling.

Dated December 10, 1996. (R. at 331).

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. at

346) .
3.

Order.

(R. at 350).

16

DATED this 11th day of September, 1997.
JENRTNSvfi HALL I DAY

Richard L.' Halliday
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage
prepaid, this 11th day of September, 1997 to the following:
Brent D. ipung
P.O. Box 6
Provo, Uta
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Fourth jMi^'rl ry-.vct Court
ofUta-hCoi - .
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CARMr.L v .
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.Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CASE NUMBER: 964400123

BRENT V. LOVELESS,

DATED: DECEMBER 10, 1996

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

JEANNE M. LOVELESS,

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

Defendant.

Trial was held September 3 and 18, 1996, at which Brent D. Young represented
plaintiff Brent V. Loveless ("Brent") while Richard L. Halliday represented defendant
Jeanne M. Loveless ("Jeanne"). Thereafter the parties were allowed time to submit
post-trial briefs, which briefs were filed October 10, 1996. I now issue this ruling.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I find that the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1.

The parties were married March 11, 1994, a second marriage for each.

2.

At the time of the marriage Brent was the custodial parent of his four

minor children from a prior marriage and Jeanne was the custodial parent for her one
minor daughter from her prior marriage.
3.

Brent is a school teacher and works his summers at the Pay son City

0331

golf course. In the past he has worked in construction.
4.

Prior to the marriage and after his earlier divorce, Brent built a new

home in which he and his children were living at the time of this marriage. Brent did
most of the construction himself.
5.

At the time of the marriage the main floor of the home was complete.

6.

Before the marriage Brent had finished two basement bedrooms and he

had done much of the initial framing of the family room, the basement bathroom and
one more bedroom. These last three rooms, however, were not completed at the time
of the marriage.
7.

Before the marriage Brent had landscaped the yards and property. He

had planted the lawn and trees, created a garden space and installed the deck. The
only landscaping which he had not completed was the flower beds, which were built
and planted after the marriage.
8.

In December 1993, only three months prior to the marriage, Brent

refinanced the home. In order to refinance Brent had the home appraised. The
appraised value in December 1993 was $98,000.
9.

The refinance loan on the home was in the sum of $69,000, all of which

was outstanding at the time of the marriage as the first payment on the new loan was
due in March 1994, the first month of the marriage.
10.

After the marriage the parties agreed to complete the downstairs

bathroom and the one room to be a bedroom as they needed an additional sleeping
room.

2
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11.

Brent spent over $2,100 during the marriage in completing the

downstairs rooms.
12.

Essentially all of the materials and supplies used in the completion of

the downstairs rooms were paid for by Brent although Jeanne paid around $16 for
blinds for the downstairs rooms and she paid $150 to repair the dishwasher.
13.

Brent performed some of the labor to complete the downstairs rooms

but hired most out. Jeanne stained the doors and moldings for the new construction,
installed the blinds and hung wallpaper in the kitchen.
14.

A portion of the funds to complete the downstairs came from a garage

sale which the parties held after the marriage.
15.

Brent contributed all of the items for the garage sale other than one

refrigerator which Jeanne contributed.
16.

Jeanne also gave her son a washer, dryer and a water bed which she

brought to the marriage in exchange for him providing the labor to install the
bathroom fixtures.
17.

During the marriage Jeanne purchased some flowers for the flower

gardens of the home.
18.

In June 1995 Jeanne felt the marriage was in trouble and, unknown to

Brent, she applied for housing assistance and applied for occupancy in an apartment
complex in Payson.
19.

Because of the tight rental market, no vacancy in the complex existed at

that time.

3
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20.

In December 1995 Jeanne separated from Brent and moved into the

apartment complex.
21.

Because of Jeanne's actions in applying to rent an apartment in June

1995 and in separating in December 1995, she treated the marriage as over at that
time. It is appropriate the marriage be treated as over in December 1995. Thus, the
respective interests of the parties in the home and other assets should be fixed as of
that date.
22.

During the marriage the parties paid over $21,000 in house payments

but because such a large share of the payments was applied to interest, in December
1995 the mortgage had a balance of $64,000.
23.

At the time of the parties separation in December 1995 the home had a

value of $137,000. At the time of trial it had a value of $140,000 (Brent's appraiser
fixed the value at trial at $137,000 and Jeanne's appraiser fixed the value at trial at
$143,000.)
24.

All but $6,600 of the increase in the value of the home is attributable to

appreciation as the real estate market in Utah County has been particularly strong
during the time of this marriage. The balance of the increase in the value of the home
is attributable to the completion of the basement rooms.
25.

While Jeanne asserts an entitlement to an interest in the home, she has

not demonstrated her right to such an entitlement because:
a)

Brent brought the home into the marriage,

b)

Brent paid for essentially all of the improvements to the
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basement,
c)

Jeanne did little to improve the value of the home other than the
routine maintenance which comes with living in the home and
she purchased and planted some flowers and she stained the
doors and moldings. In addition Jeanne gave her son a washer,
dryer and bed in exchange for his labor.

d)

Brent paid the mortgage payments and the utilities on the home
during the marriage.

e)

Prior to the marriage Jeanne had rent and utility expenses for the
small home which she rented of approximately $487 per month.
After the separation she had rent and utility expenses of
approximately $361 per month. Because her net expense has
decreased, she cannot claim a need for an interest in the home in
lieu of alimony.

£)

The parties never commingled their incomes. Brent used his
income for the family living expenses. Jeanne spent her income
on her car payment, on some of the family extras such as alcohol
and Sunday dinners, occasional allowances for the children and
on family outings. She kept for herself the rest of her funds.
Because she was able to keep a significant portion of her funds,
while Brent paid the mortgage payments, Jeanne does not have a
legitimate claim to a credit for the mortgage payments which
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Brent made.
26.

At the time of the marriage Jeanne worked at Walmart making $6.20

per hour. At the time of separation she was earning $7.50 working for Neways. At
the time of trial she was earning $9.00 per hour.
27.

Brent's income has remained very flat during the marriage.

28.

During the marriage Jeanne used her paycheck to pay her car payment

and to provide some cash needs of the family, although the majority of the family
living expenses came from Brent's income. The mortgage payment, utilities and most
of the food expense came from his income.
29.

During the marriage Brent made contributions to his retirement program

in the sum of $1,460. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or $725.
30.

During the marriage Brent made contributions to a life insurance

annuity in the sum of $1,600. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or
$800.
31.

During the marriage the parties acquired a freezer for $375 and a

camper for $375. These are awarded to Brent but Jeanne is entitled to one-half their
value, or $375.
32.

During the marriage the parties acquired a boat. It was financed and

has no equity value over its debt. It is awarded to Brent but he must make the
payments thereon.
33.

At the time of the marriage Brent had only limited credit card debt and

he had his home mortgage. During the marriage he incurred additional credit card
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debt of $3,135. He incurred a debt to Dr. Farley for $741 for a crown for Jeanne's
tooth not covered by insurance. He incurred a debt to Nebo Credit Union in the sum
of $800. Each of these are marital obligations. A significant portion of the credit card
debt was incurred after Jeanne began planning her separation in June 1995 and are
expenses which Brent would not have incurred had he known of her plan to leave him
when housing became available.
34.

Brent also incurred a loan to buy a boat and an add-on loan for the boat

of $804. Because he is keeping the boat, he should be responsible for both of these
loans.
35.

At the time of the marriage Jeanne had considerable debt, including a

car loan for her Chevrolet Beretta and debts to Dr. Dewey of $670, to Mountain View
Hospital of $670, to Bonneville Collection of $900 and to the lawyer from her first
divorce of $600. All of these were paid from marital funds during the marriage except
$80 of Dr. Dewey's bill. I assign neither party a benefit nor obligation from these
marital payments.
36.

Near the end of the marriage Brent borrowed $1,000 from his father and

$2,000 from his sisters. The loans from the sisters were incurred after the parties
separated while the loan from his dad was incurred just prior to separation. These
funds were used on family expenses, although most were used for Brent's family
expenses post-separation. These are separate debts for which Jeanne is not
responsible.
37.

Brent advanced $300 to pay for an appraisal which Jeanne wanted of
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the house. It is appropriate that she reimburse him for this. He also was required on
a temporary basis to give to Jeanne $500 of his tax refund to her to pay toward her
attorney's fees. It is appropriate that Jeanne reimburse him for this.
38.

Brent incurred attorney's fees of $14,888.76, which fees are based upon

counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic matters, this is
a reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred.
39.

Brent asserts he spent a significant amount of fees in this case to protect

against what he claimed was Jeanne's unwarranted effort to obtain a portion of the
home equity.
40.

As noted hereafter, Brent has prevailed in his defense of his separate

ownership of the home.
41.

Because Brent is the sole provider for his three minor children, and

given the nature of his employment as a school teacher, he does not have the
capability fully to respond to the attorney's fee bill which he has incurred.
42.

Jeanne has incurred attorney's fees in the sum of $5,688 which fees are

based upon counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic
matters, this is a reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred.
43.

At the outset of this case Brent was ordered, under a temporary order,

to pay $500 of his 1996 tax refund to pay toward Jeanne's attorney's fees. He did so.
44.

While Jeanne appears to have the capacity over time to pay her own

fees, she does not have the capacity to pay Brent's fees.
45.

Brent asserts that he spent a larger amount of fees because Jeanne did
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not properly respond to outstanding discovery requests and Brent claims he had to
obtain that information through subpoena from others. In part, at least, he is correct in
that assertion.
46.

Because I have no specific evidence of how much added expense Brent

incurred because of Jeanne's failure properly or timely to respond to the discovery, I
have no factual basis to determine what amount of Brent's fees should be charged to
Jeanne.
47.

Each party should be required to bear their own attorney's fees.
ANALYSIS AND RULING

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, I now rule as follows:
Hie home.
Because the home was Brent's before the marriage, because he paid the
mortgage payments and utilities and paid the lion's share of the family living expenses,
because he provided the financing for almost all of the improvement to the home
during the marriage, and because this was a marriage of short duration (the parties
married March 1994 and separated December 1995, although Jeanne began her plans
to separate in June 1995), it is appropriate that Brent retain the house as a separate
asset. Although it appreciated greatly in value during the marriage, the home was a
separate asset prior to the marriage and Jeanne did little to enhance its value. The
home should be awarded to Brent free of any claim from Jeanne.
Other property distributions.
Brent is awarded the camper and freezer, his retirement and his interest in the
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life insurance annuity but is obligated to reimburse Jeanne for half of each as follows:
Camper
Freezer
retirement
life insurance
Total

$ 375
$ 375
$1,450
$1.600
$3,800/2 = $1,900

Brent also is awarded the boat and the debt thereon as the boat has no equity.
Debts.
Brent is assigned to pay the following marital debts but Jeanne is responsible
to reimburse him for one-half thereof:
Visa
Mastercard
Dr. Farley
Nebo Credit Union
Total

$ 604
$2,531
$ 791
$ 800
$4,726 / 2 = $2,363.

Post separation Brent has paid the following marital obligations for which he is
entitled to a reimbursement from Jeanne of one-half:
Shaffer & Assoc.
Columbia House
Total

$ 109
$ 77
$ 1 8 6 / 2 = $93,

I award Brent no claim against Jeanne for the loans which he borrowed from
his father and sisters at or near the time of the separation or the boat add-on loan nor
do I award him any claim against Jeanne for her debts paid during the marriage as
those were marital payments.
Summary of financial adjustments.
Jeanne is entitled to payment of $1,900 from Brent for her interest in personal
property, retirement and life insurance. Brent is entitled to payment from Jeaime for
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one-half of the marital debt of $2,363 and one-half of the marital debt paid by Brent
post-separation in the sum of $93. Further, pursuant to a temporary order of the Court
Brent paid $500 of Jeanne's attorney's fees and $300 for her appraisal of the home.
She bears responsibility for each of these and must repay Brent for them. The
summary of all of these payments is as follows.
Brent owes Jeanne:
Jeanne owes Brent:

Total

$1,900
$2,363
$ 93
$ 500
$ 300
$3,256.

When these are offset Jeanne owes Brent $1,356.
Attorney's fees.
Each party incurred significant attorney's fees. Brent particularly wants an
award of fees as he felt that Jeanne needlessly caused him to incur significant fees in
defending his claim to the home. In fact, however, each party has the ability to pay
their own attorney's fees and neither has the ability to pay the other's fees. Each
should be ordered to bear their own fees and costs in this matter.
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Brent's counsel
is directed to prepare proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and an amended
decree of divorce, consistent with this ruling but augmented as appropriate.
Dated this W_ day of December, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

ANTHONY^ W. SCHOFTELD, JUDGE
11
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this / U day of December, 1996:
RICHARD L HALLIDAY ATTY
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BRENT D YOUNG ATTY
PO BOX 672
PROVOUT 84603
CARMA B. SMITH
CLERK OF THE COURT
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT V. LOVELESS,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(TRIAL DATE SEPTEMBER 3, 18,
1996)

v.
JEANNE M. LOVELESS,

Civil No. 96440123
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

Defendant.
Trial was held September 3 and 18, 1996, at which Brent D. Young represented
plaintiff Brent V. Loveless ("Brent") while Richard L. Halliday represented defendant
Jeanne M. Loveless ("Jeanne"). Thereafter the parties were allowed time to submit posttrial briefs, which briefs were filed October 10, 1996. The court now makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence:

1.

The parties were married March 11, 1994, a second marriage for each.

2.

At the time of the marriage Brent was the custodial parent of his four minor

children from a prior marriage and Jeanne was the custodial parent for her one minor
daughter from her prior marriage.
3.

Brent is a school teacher and works his summers at the Pay son City golf

course. In the past he has worked in construction.
4.

Prior to the marriage and after his earlier divorce, Brent built a new home in

which he and his children were living at the time of this marriage. Brent did most of the
construction himself
5.

At the time of the marriage the main floor of the home was complete.

6.

Before the marriage Brent had finished two basement bedrooms and he had

done much of the initial framing of the family room, the basement bathroom and one
more bedroom. These last three rooms, however, were not completed at the time of the
marriage.
7.

Before the marriage Brent had landscaped the yards and property. He had

planted the lawn and trees, created a garden space and installed the deck. The only
landscaping which he had not completed was the flower beds, which were built and
planted after the marriage.
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8.

In December 1993, only three months prior to the marriage, Brent

refinanced the home. In order to refinance Brent had the home appraised. The appraised
value in December 1993 was $98,000.
9.

The refinance loan on the home was in the sum of $69,000, all of which

was outstanding at the time of the marriage as the first payment on the new loan was due
in March 1994, the first month of the marriage.
10.

After the marriage the parties agreed to complete the downstairs bathroom

and the one room to be a bedroom as they needed an additional sleeping room.
11.

Brent spent over $2,100 during the marriage in completing the downstairs

12.

Essentially all of the materials and supplies used in the completion of the

rooms.

downstairs rooms were paid for by Brent although Jeanne paid around $16 for blinds for
the downstairs rooms and she paid $150 to repair the dishwasher.
13.

Brent performed some of the labor to complete the downstairs rooms but

hired most out. Jeanne stained the doors and moldings for the new construction, installed
the blinds and hung wallpaper in the kitchen.
14.

A portion of the funds to complete the downstairs came from a garage sale

which the parties held after the marriage.
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15.

Brent contributed all of the items for the garage sale other than one

refrigerator which Jeanne contributed.
16.

Jeanne also gave her son a washer, dryer and a water bed which she brought

to the marriage in exchange for him providing the labor to install the bathroom fixtures.
17.

During the marriage Jeanne purchased some flowers for the flower gardens

of the home.
18.

In June 1995 Jeanne felt the marriage was in trouble and, unknown to

Brent, she applied for housing assistance and applied for occupancy in an apartment
complex in Payson.
19.

Because of the tight rental market, no vacancy in the complex existed at that

20.

In December 1995 Jeanne separated from Brent and moved into the

time.

apartment complex.
21.

Because of Jeanne's actions in applying to rent an apartment in June 1995

and in separating in December 1995, she treated the marriage as over at that time. It is
appropriate the marriage be treated as over in December 1995. Thus, the respective
interests of the parties in the home and other assets should be fixed as of that date.
22.

During the marriage the parties paid over $21,000 in house payments but
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because such a large share of the payments was applied to interest, in December 1995 the
mortgage had a balance of $64,000.
23.

At the time of the parties separation in December 1995 the home had a

value of $137,000. At the time of trial it had a value of $140,000 (Brent's appraiser fixed
the value at trial at $137,000 and Jeanne's appraiser fixed the value at trial at $143,000.)
24.

All but $6,600 of the increase in the value of the home is attributable to

appreciation as the real estate market in Utah County has been particularly strong during
the time of this marriage. The balance of the increase in the value of the home is
attributable to the completion of the basement rooms.
25.

While Jeanne asserts an entitlement to an interest in the home, she has not

demonstrated her right to such an entitlement because:
a)

Brent brought the home into the marriage,

b)

Brent paid for essentially all of the improvements to the basement,

c)

Jeanne did little to improve the value of the home other than the routine
maintenance which comes with living in the home and she purchased and
planted some flowers and she stained the doors and moldings. In addition
Jeanne gave her son a washer, dryer and bed in exchange for his labor.

d)

Brent paid the mortgage payments and the utilities on the home during the

5

marriage.
e)

Prior to the marriage Jeanne had rent and utility expenses for the small
home which she rented of approximately $487 per month. After the
separation she had rent and utility expenses of approximately $361 per
month. Because her net expense has decreased, she cannot claim a need for
an interest in the home in lieu of alimony.

f)

The parties never commingled their incomes. Brent used his income for the
family living expenses. Jeanne spent her income on her car payment, on
some of the family extras such as alcohol and Sunday dinners, occasional
allowances for the children and on family outings. She kept for herself the
rest of her funds. Because she was able to keep a significant portion of her
funds, while Brent paid the mortgage payments, Jeanne does not have a
legitimate claim to a credit for the mortgage payments which Brent made.

26.

At the time of the marriage Jeanne worked at Wahnart making $6.20 per

hour. At the time of separation she was earning $7.50 working for Neways. At the time
of trial she was earning $9.00 per hour.
27.

Brent's income has remained very flat during the marriage.

28.

During the marriage Jeanne used her paycheck to pay her car payment and
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to provide some cash needs of the family, although the majority of the family living
expenses came from Brent's income. The mortgage payment, utilities and most of the
food expense came from his income,
29.

During the marriage Brent made contributions to his retirement program in

the sum of $1,460. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or $725.
30.

During the marriage Brent made contributions to a life insurance annuity in

the sum of $1,600. Jeanne is entitled to one-half of those contributions, or $800.
31.

During the marriage the parties acquired a freezer for $375 and a camper

for $375. These are awarded to Brent but Jeanne is entitled to one-half their value, or
$375.
32.

During the marriage the parties acquired a boat. It was financed and has no

equity value over its debt. It is awarded to Brent but he must make the payments thereon.
33.

At the time of the marriage Brent had only limited credit card debt and

he had his home mortgage. During the marriage he incurred additional credit card debt of
$3,135. He incurred a debt to Dr. Farley for $741 for a crown for Jeanne's tooth not
covered by insurance. He incurred a debt to Nebo Credit Union in the sum of $800. Each
of these are marital obligations. A significant portion of the credit card debt was incurred
after Jeanne began planning her separation in June 1995 and are expenses which Brent
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would not have incurred had he known of her plan to leave him when housing became
available.
34.

Brent also incurred a loan to buy a boat and an add-on loan for the boat of

$804. Because he is keeping the boat, he should be responsible for both of these loans.
35.

At the time of the marriage Jeanne had considerable debt, including a car

loan for her Chevrolet Beretta and debts to Dr. Dewey of $670, to Mountain View
Hospital of $670, to Bonneville Collection of $900 and to the lawyer from her first
divorce of $600. All of these were paid from marital funds during the marriage except
$80 of Dr. Dewey's bill. I assign neither party a benefit nor obligation from these marital
payments.
36.

Near the end of the marriage Brent borrowed $1,000 from his father and

$2,000 from his sisters. The loans from the sisters were incurred after the parties
separated while the loan from his dad was incurred just prior to separation. These funds
were used on family expenses, although most were used for Brent's family expenses post
separation. These are separate debts for which Jeanne is not responsible.
37.

Brent advanced $300 to pay for an appraisal which Jeanne wanted of the

house. It is appropriate that she reimburse him for this. He also was required on a
temporary basis to give to Jeanne $500 of his tax refund to her to pay toward her
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attorney's fees. It is appropriate that Jeanne reimburse him for this.
38.

Brent incurred attorney's fees of $14,888.76, which fees are based upon

counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic matters, this is a
reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred.
39.

Brent asserts he spent a significant amount of fees in this case to protect

against what he claimed was Jeanne's unwarranted effort to obtain a portion of the home
equity.
40.

As noted hereafter, Brent has prevailed in his defense of his separate

ownership of the home.
41.

Because Brent is the sole provider for his three minor children, and given

the nature of his employment as a school teacher, he does not have the capability fully to
respond to the attorney's fee bill which he has incurred.
42.

Jeanne has incurred attorney's fees in the sum of $5,688 which fees are

based upon counsel billing $125 per hour. Given counsel's experience in domestic
matters, this is a reasonable rate. It appears all of the time was necessarily incurred.
43.

At the outset of this case Brent was ordered, under a temporary order, to

pay $500 of his 1996 tax refund to pay toward Jeanne's attorney's fees. He did so.
44.

While Jeanne appears to have the capacity over time to pay her own fees,
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she does not have the capacity to pay Brent's fees.
45.

Brent asserts that he spent a larger amount of fees because Jeanne did not

properly respond to outstanding discovery requests and Brent claims he had to obtain that
information through subpoena from others. In part, at least, he is correct in that assertion.
46.

Because I have no specific evidence of how much added expense Brent

incurred because of Jeanne's failure properly or timely to respond to the discovery, I have
no factual basis to determine what amount of Brent's fees should be charged to Jeanne.
47.

Each party should be required to bear their own attorney's fees.

48.

Defendant shall be restored her former name of McNeil.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1) That Mr. Loveless is entitled to be awarded the house as a separate asset, free
of any claim from Jeanne;
(2) That the parties are entitled to a distribution of their personal property;
retirement and life insurance annuity;
(3) The parties are entitled to an allocation of their marital debts;
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(4) That each party should pay his or her own attorney fees and costs;
(5) That defendant is entitled to be restored her former name of McNeil.

RICHARD L. HALLIDAY
Attorney for Defendant, Jeanne M. Loveless
H \COMMON\HEATHER\LVLSS FOF
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRENT V. LOVELESS,
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER
(TRIAL DATE SEPTEMBER 3, 18,
1996)

JEANNE M. LOVELESS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 96440H23
Judge Anthony W. SchofielcL

Trial was held September 3 and 18, 1996, at which Brent D. Young represented
plaintiff Brent V. Loveless ("Brent") while Richard L. Halliday represented defendant
Jeanne M. Loveless ("Jeanne"). Thereafter the parties were allowed time to submit posttrial briefs, which briefs were filed October 10, 1996. Based on the accompanying
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The home. Brent is awarded the house as a separate asset. Although it
appreciated greatly in value during the marriage, the home was a separate asset prior to
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the marriage and Jeanne did little to enhance its value. The home is awarded to Brent free
of any claim from Jeanne.
2. Other property distributions. Brent is awarded the camper and freezer, his
retirement and his interest in the life insurance annuity but is obligated to reimburse
Jeanne for half of each as follows:
Camper
Freezer
retirement
life insurance
Total

$375
$ 375
$1,450
$1,600
$3,800/2 = $1,900

Brent also is awarded the boat and the debt thereon as the boat has no equity.
3. Debts. Brent is assigned to pay the following marital debts but Jeanne is
responsible to reimburse him for one-half thereof:
Visa
$ 604
Mastercard
$2,531
Dr. Farley
$791
Nebo Credit Union $ 800
Total
$4,726 / 2 = $2,363
Post separation Brent has paid the following marital obligations for which he is
entitled to a reimbursement from Jeanne of one-half:
Shaffer & Assoc.
Columbia House
Total

$ 109
$ 77
$ 186 / 2 = $93.
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4. The court awards Brent no claim against Jeanne for the loans which he
borrowed from his father and sisters at or near the time of the separation or the boat addon loan nor is he awarded any claim against Jeanne for her debts paid during the marriage
as those were marital payments.
5. Summary of financial adjustments. Jeanne is entitled to payment of $1,900
from Brent for her interest in personal property, retirement and life insurance. Brent is
entitled to payment from Jeanne for one-half of the marital debt of $2,363 and one-half
of the marital debt paid by Brent post-separation in the sum of $93. Further, pursuant to a
temporary order of the Court Brent paid $500 of Jeanne's attorney's fees and $300 for her
appraisal of the home. She bears responsibility for each of these and must repay Brent for
them. The summary of all of these payments is as follows.
Brent owes Jeanne:
Jeanne owes Brent:

Total

$ 1,900
$2,363
$93
$500
$300
$3,256

When these are offset Jeanne owes Brent $1,356.
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6. Attorney's fees. Each party will bear their own fees and costs in this matter.
7. Defendant is restored her former name of McNeil.
Dated this _Tj_ day of

J<Wd
RPn/tt^/

, 1997.

J&O&iv. rSF&&&*

BY THE COURT:

ANTHONY W. S
Approved as to form:

RICHARD L. HALLIDAY
Attorney for Defendant, Jeanne Loveless

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and Findings
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, on the 13th day of January. 1997:
Richard L Halliday
Attorney at Law
2002 East 11500 South
Sandy, UT 84092
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